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SEXUAL PRIVACY IN THE MODERN ERA: LOWE V. SWANSON
Katie Rasfeld Terpstra∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Federal judges have sex on the brain. It’s not entirely their fault: a
litany of sexual privacy cases has swamped the court system following
the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas.1 The
Lawrence Court upheld sexual privacy, but the muddled language of the
decision has led to numerous subsequent battles over the precise
meaning of the case.2 The circuits are split over the implications of the
Lawrence decision in related sexual matters.3
The Sixth Circuit has recently weighed in on this debate. In Lowe v.
Swanson, the court refused to invalidate an Ohio statute that in part
forbids stepparents from engaging in consensual sexual conduct with
their adult stepchildren.4 The holding is based on the court’s reading of
Lawrence as being based on rational basis review, as not creating a
fundamental right to adult sexual privacy, and as not applying to
anything other than consensual homosexual activity.5 The court’s
interpretation of Lawrence squarely plants the Sixth Circuit in line with
the Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh circuits in limiting the Lawrence
holding as it relates to adult sexual privacy.6
But did the Lowe court get it right? The First, Fifth and Ninth
Circuits would likely say no, reading Lawrence much more broadly than
their sister circuits.7 The novel nature of the question presented in Lowe
coupled with the sharp divide in the circuits after the Lawrence case
requires special attention as to what Lawrence means for consenting
sexual encounters between stepparents and adult stepchildren. Through
careful consideration of the Lawrence Court’s language and actions,
along with practical and legal concerns related specifically to stepparent
and stepchild relationships, it becomes apparent that Lowe v. Swanson
∗ Associate Member, 2011–12 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d
762 (10th Cir. 2008).
3. See, e.g., Cook, 528 F.3d 42; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d 762.
4. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03
(West 2012).
5. See Lowe, 663 F.3d 258.
6. See id.; Seegmiller, 528 F.3d 762; Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v.
Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family
Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
7. Cook, 528 F.3d 42; Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008); Reliable
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
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was wrongfully decided.
This case note will first examine in Part II the background of the
issue, including Lawrence, various related Circuit Court decisions, and
Lowe itself. Part III will be dedicated to the careful analysis of the
different challenges and interpretations of Lawrence as they apply to
Lowe and stepparent and stepchild relationships.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern sexual privacy law has developed rapidly over the decade
following Lawrence. A brief historical overview is necessary to
appreciate fully the debate that lead to the Lowe decision. First,
Lawrence will be discussed, followed by an examination of the divide in
the Circuit Courts. Finally, Lowe itself will be presented.
A. Lawrence v. Texas
In Lawrence v. Texas, the petitioners were convicted of violating a
Texas statute that prohibited certain consensual sexual activity between
members of the same sex.8 The Court held that the statute violated the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution, saying that the petitioners were
free to “engage in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty.”9 The
Court expressly overturned the Bowers v. Hardwick decision, which had
previously stated that such anti-sodomy laws were constitutional.10
It is how the Court came to invalidate the statute that has led to all the
subsequent debate. Nowhere in the decision did the Lawrence Court
explicitly say that adult sexual privacy is a fundamental right.11
Additionally, the Court did not follow the usual Washington v.
Glucksburg formula for laying out a fundamental right.12 The majority
also failed to respond to Justice Scalia’s assertion in his dissent that the
majority did not create a fundamental right to sexual privacy.13 Finally,
the Lawrence majority concluded, “[t]he Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the

8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562–63 (2003). Namely, that activity was homosexual
sodomy. Id.
9. Id. at 558.
10. Id. at 578; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
11. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
12. See id.; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). Under the Glucksberg
formula, to create a fundamental right under substantive due process the Court must: (1) describe the
right and its scope in detail, and (2) describe how the right are “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.” Id.
13. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79; id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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individual’s personal and private life.”14 This language draws upon the
traditional language used when applying the low-level rational basis
review and when no fundamental right is present.15
However, it is not clear that a fundamental right was not expressed in
Lawrence and that a heightened level of judicial review was not used.16
The cases the Lawrence Court relied on all contained a protected liberty
interest in sexual matters.17 Furthermore, the Court specifically adopted
Justice Stevens’s dissent from Bowers and said that this opinion should
control in Lawrence.18 In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, Stevens
described the sexual privacy line of cases as establishing a fundamental
right for adults to engage in private intimate conduct.19 Some of the
language used by the majority in the Lawrence opinion is illuminating.
The opinion states, for example, that “liberty gives substantial protection
to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matter
pertaining to sex,”20 and that the Due Process Clause allowed the
petitioner’s conduct because “[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
enter.”21 Finally, it is difficult to reconcile the majority’s rejection of
the statute using rational basis review with the fact that promotion of
morality has been found to be a legitimate state interest in the past.22
The intended reach of the Lawrence opinion, including the continued
viability of morality laws, is also ambiguous. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia is clear that he believes the majority’s adoption of Justice
Stevens’s dissent in Bowers “effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation,” meaning that laws against “fornication, bigamy, adultery,
adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity” cannot survive even rational basis
review.23 The majority is not explicit in its intentions for morality laws
or the reach of its opinion, and Scalia’s observations are not unfounded.
The majority itself summarized Stevens’s Bowers dissent as holding
“the fact that a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a
14. Id. at 560 (majority opinion).
15. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
16. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79.
17. Id. at 565–66. These cases were: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating
a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives and family planning counseling); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
people); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing the fundamental right to an abortion); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a state law forbidding the sale and distribution
of contraceptives to people under the age of 16).
18. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 577–78.
19. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
20. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 572.
21. Id. at 578 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
22. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
23. Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a
law prohibiting the practice.”24 Furthermore, the Court went on to say
its “obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate its own
moral code.”25
The majority only alluded to the scope of its holding, never directly
addressing Scalia’s observations.26 These allusions to the scope of the
decision included a mandate that the State should not attempt to “define
the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”27 and by pointing out
that “[t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused.”28
With both the controversial nature of the decision of Lawrence v.
Texas and ambiguous language of the majority’s opinion, the Lawrence
decision was bound to create discord among the circuits in related areas,
and that is exactly what it has done.
B. Circuits that Construe Lawrence Narrowly
The Eleventh Circuit first considered the implications of Lawrence in
Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children & Family Services.29
The court opined that Lawrence was about “establish[ing] a greater
respect than previously existed in the law for the right of consenting
adults to engage in private sexual conduct.”30 However, the court failed
to find that Lawrence had created a fundamental right, noting that the
traditional Glucksberg analysis was missing and the language used to
invalidate the statute in Lawrence was rational basis review.31
The Eleventh Circuit again was asked to find a fundamental right to
sexual privacy in Williams v. Attorney General of Ala. and refused.32
The court echoed the reasoning in Lofton for not finding a fundamental
right, adding that the Supreme Court has been presented with multiple
opportunities to find a fundamental right to sexual privacy and has

24. Id. at 560.
25. Id. at 559.
26. See id. at 558–79.
27. Id. at 567.
28. Id. at 578.
29. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Florida law prohibiting homosexual foster
parents and guardians from adopting children was not unconstitutional).
30. Id. at 815–16.
31. Id. at 816–17.
32. 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that an Alabama statute prohibiting the commercial
distribution of devices that were primarily for sexual stimulation was not unconstitutional).
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always declined to do so.33 Furthermore, according to the majority,
Lawrence only established the unconstitutionality of laws criminalizing
adult consensual sodomy and did not create a fundamental right to
homosexual sodomy.34 The court went on to apply rational basis,
naming public morality as the legitimate state interest sufficient to
uphold the challenged law.35
In Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City the Tenth Circuit also refused to find
that Lawrence created a fundamental right to sexual privacy.36 The
court stated that the Supreme Court has never validated a broad
description to a liberty interest such as the right “to engage in a private
act of consensual sex,”37 and went on to find that rational basis, not
heightened scrutiny, was applied in Lawrence.38
Finally, in the Seventh Circuit case Muth v. Frank, the Court upheld a
Wisconsin statute that criminalized incestuous relationships, even if they
were between two consenting adults.39 The court distinguished the
sodomy statutes in Lawrence from the incest statute in question, simply
stating that Lawrence did not address incest statutes and thus the
petitioner could not benefit from the holding in Lawrence.40 Like the
similarly-minded circuits, the Seventh Circuit also denied that a
fundamental right to sexual privacy was created and asserted that
rational basis was the standard of review used in Lawrence.41
C. Circuits that Construe Lawrence Broadly
Although the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits are all in
agreement about what Lawrence stands for, other circuit courts disagree.
The First Circuit summarized its position in Cook v. Gates, stating:
Taking into account the precedent relied on by Lawrence, the tenor of its
language, its special reliance on Justice Stevens’ Bowers dissent, and its
rejection of morality as an adequate basis for the law in question, we are
convinced that Lawrence recognized that adults maintain a protected
liberty interest to engage in certain ‘consensual sexual intimacy in the

33. Id. at 1235–36.
34. Id. at 1236.
35. Id. at 1250.
36. 528 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the city did not violate the Constitution when it
reprimanded the petitioner, a police officer, for having off-duty, consensual sexual encounter with
another adult).
37. Id. at 770.
38. Id. at 771.
39. 412 F.3d 808, 810 (7th Cir. 2005).
40. Id. at 817.
41. Id. at 818.
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home.’42

However, the court noted that even though Lawrence recognized a
fundamental right to sexual privacy, the Supreme Court did not apply
strict scrutiny to invalidate the Texas statute.43 Rather, the Lawrence
Court applied some standard between rational basis and strict scrutiny.44
The Ninth Circuit in Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force acknowledged the
split in the lines of interpretation of Lawrence and declared that in
ambiguous circumstances, courts should look to what the Supreme
Court actually did in the case rather than isolating relevant pieces of
text.45 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Lawrence Court
had applied a heightened level of scrutiny because rational basis review
affords such a minimal level of protection, and the rationale for the
holding in Lawrence is inconsistent with how rational basis review is
used.46 Like the Cook court, the Witt court ultimately found that an
intermediate standard of review is appropriate after Lawrence, stating
that the “government must advance an important governmental interest,
the intrusion must significantly further that interest, and the intrusion
must be necessary to further that interest.”47
In Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, the Fifth Circuit held against
the State attempting to justify laws that limit sexual privacy under a
“morality” justification.48 The court stated that upholding a statute that
controls what people do in private based on a morality justification
alone would be to ignore Lawrence and its holding that this type of
justification is insufficient.49 Interestingly, the court declined to
examine the level of review used in Lawrence50 and simply stated that
the only way to make sense of Lawrence is to read it as recognizing a
right to sexual privacy without delving in to a lengthy analysis.51

42. 528 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” statute did not
violate the Constitution even after the Lawrence decision).
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id. at 56.
45. 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding petitioner’s case for further review using an
intermediate standard to determine if her off-duty sexual relationship with a civilian woman and
subsequent suspension under “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” violated her constitutional rights).
46. Id. at 816–17. The Court stated, “Were the Court applying rational basis review, it would not
identify a legitimate state interest to “justify” the particular intrusion of liberty at issue in Lawrence;
regardless of the liberty involved, any hypothetical rationale for the law would do.” Id. at 817.
47. Id. at 819.
48. 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Texas statute that criminalized the selling,
advertising, giving or lending of any sexual stimulation device except for a few narrow exceptions is
unconstitutional).
49. Id. at 745–46.
50. See id. at 744–45.
51. Id. at 744.
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D. Lowe v. Swanson
With the circuits so sharply divided in their readings of Lawrence, the
Sixth Circuit joined the split with its holding in Lowe v. Swanson.52 In
Lowe, the petitioner had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with
his 22 year old stepdaughter.53 This violated an Ohio statute that
prohibited stepparents from engaging in sexual conduct with their
stepchildren, and the petitioner was charged with sexual battery.54
Lowe petitioned the trial court to drop his charges, arguing that the
statute is intended to apply when a child is involved, not two adults, and
that the government has “no legitimate interest in regulating sexual
activity between consenting adults.”55 The court denied his motion, and
Lowe pled no contest to the charge.56 The Ohio Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld his conviction, stating that
“Lawrence did not announce a ‘fundamental’ right to all consensual
adult sexual activity,”57 and that Lawrence had applied rational basis
review and thus rational basis applied to Lowe.58
The Sixth Circuit declined to engage in an analysis of Lawrence in
order to determine the appropriate standard of review in sexual privacy
cases or to determine if Lawrence upheld a privacy right for adult
consensual activity.59 Instead, the court simply denied Lowe’s petition
for habeas relief, citing the split between the circuits as proof that the
Ohio courts had not unreasonably misapplied federal law.60
The Lowe court aligned itself with the Muth court, stating that
Lawrence is inapplicable to the present case because Lawrence did not
address incest or incest-like statutes.61 The court found that Lawrence
specifically excluded statutes such as the one in question from
consideration, reasoning that stepparent and stepchild relationships are
of such type where the stepchild may be coerced into the activity and
consent may not be easily refused.62
The court also found that the state of Ohio has a far greater interest in
regulating the sexual relationships between stepparents and stepchildren
than Texas had in regulating homosexual sodomy. The State’s
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

663 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 260; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2012).
Lowe, 663 F.3d at 260.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. Lowe, 2005 WL 1983964, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005)).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
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“paramount concern is protecting the family from the destructive
influence of intra-family, extra-marital sexual contact . . .” and this
interest was left intact after the Lawrence decision.63 The court
dismissed Lowe’s assertions that a vague governmental interest in
protecting family units is insufficient to validate the statute as applied to
him because there had been no evidence on the record of any familiallike relationship with the stepdaughter or “family unit” ever existed.
Instead, the court asserted that the State has an interest to protect all
families against sexual contact that may be harmful to the family unit,
regardless of the facts surrounding any particular family dynamic in
question.64
Finally, the court found no merit in Lowe’s claim that the Ohio
statute violates Lawrence because it is based on morality. First, the
Sixth Circuit stated that the statute is not entirely premised on morality
and that Ohio “has a legitimate and important interest in protecting
families.”65 Second, the Court denied that Lawrence invalidated all
criminal laws that are based in part on morality.66
The hasty analysis of Lawrence the Sixth Circuit undertook in Lowe
v. Swanson, coupled with the novel question presented within the case,
leaves the need for a more methodical and critical look into Lawrence
and its varying interpretations to determine how laws regarding
consensual relationships between stepparents and their adult
stepchildren should be handled.
III. ANALYSIS
Several facets of the Lawrence and Lowe holdings require close
scrutiny. This Part will first consider if Lawrence applies to stepparent
and stepchild sexual relationships, followed by a discussion of whether
Lawrence created a fundamental right and what standard of review
applies to cases governed by Lawrence. Finally, this Part will conclude
with an analysis of Lowe under Lawrence.
A. Does Lawrence Apply?
Despite what the Lowe and Muth courts assert, Lawrence is certainly
about more than just homosexual sodomy. The common law system
simply does not operate in such a way that confines each case’s
precedental value to the narrow factual circumstances giving rise to the
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 264–65.
Id. at 264.
Id.
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suit, unless the court is explicit in its intentions to hold so narrowly.67
Although the Lawrence Court is vague about the scope of its holding,
the language of Lawrence and its continuous use by lower circuits in a
wide array of “taboo” sexual conduct cases shows that its holding
governs more than homosexual sodomy.68 The Lawrence Court’s
decree that a state should not attempt to “define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of
an institution the law protects” implicates the idea that the Court viewed
its decision in Lawrence decision as reaching into all laws governing
sexual relationships.69 This language does, however, carve out two
exceptions where the state’s interests can overcome sexual privacy: first,
where there is injury to a person; and second, if it would violate “an
institution the law protects.”70
Thus, incest and incest-like statutes fall within Lawrence’s broad
sexual privacy realm and are governed by Lawrence, but whether or not
they enjoy the same protection as homosexual sodomy depends on
whether or not they fit within one of these two exceptions.71
The first exception, injury to a person, does not automatically apply
solely because the relationship is between a stepparent and stepchild.
Sexual conduct between a stepparent and stepchild could fall into this
category if, for example, one of the parties were a minor, were mentally
handicapped, or did not consent to the activity. However, this is true for
every instance of sexual activity regardless of the relationship between
the parties involved. Just because the two participating individuals have
a stepparent and stepchild relationship does not necessarily mean that
one of them will be injured by the sexual conduct. The plain meaning of
the Lawrence decision is that the exception only applies when there is
actually an injury to a party, not merely the possibility of an injury.72 To
hold otherwise would give states the power to curtail the vast majority
of all sexual conduct because of a possibility of injury. Looking
specifically at the Lowe case, the stepchild consented to the activity and
was neither a minor nor mentally handicapped.73 No facts on the record
suggested that she was injured in any way at all, much less that she was
67. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
68. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005); Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378
F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004); Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th
Cir. 2004).
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
70. See id.
71. In a separate case, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that the statute in question in Lowe v.
Swanson, Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.03(A), is “quite obviously designed to be Ohio’s criminal incest
statute.” State v. Noggle, 615 N.E.2d 1040, 1042 (1993).
72. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
73. See Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 259–60 (6th Cir. 2011).
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injured because of her legal status as Lowe’s stepdaughter.74
The Lowe court pointed to the fear of coercion as a factor in
upholding the Ohio statute.75 More specifically, the court reasoned that
because of the nature of stepparent and stepchild relationships, consent
may not easily be refused.76 However, fear of coercion is not a
compelling enough reason to keep the statute or to say that this causes
stepparent and stepchild relationships to fall under this “injury”
category. Although it is likely true that some stepparents abuse their
position in gaining the “consent” of their stepchildren, it is not always
true, and it is not the situation in Lowe. It is undisputed that the
stepchild in Lowe consented, and there was no indication that the
consent was coerced.77 It is not only conceivable that a stepparent and
stepchild could have a non-coerced consensual relationship, but it is
actually what happened in Lowe.78 Again, lumping all stepparent and
stepchild relationships into this injury to a person exception sweeps too
broadly.
Furthermore, coerced “consent” is not truly consent at all, and thus
rape laws apply.79 Any time consent is not given and sexual activity
occurs the sexual activity is illegal, regardless of the legal relationship of
the participants.80 It is just as illegal for a person to have nonconsensual sex with their spouse as it is with their adult stepchild.81
Because rape laws apply to these types of scenarios, it serves no real
purpose to have a separate body of law also prohibiting coercion.
Taking into account practical considerations as well, stepparents are
much more likely to know that coerced sexual activity is illegal because
it is a form of rape, rather than know it is illegal because it occurs with
their stepchild. Thus, the Ohio statute provides no deterrence effect for
this undesirable conduct. It is simpler and more logical to allow rape
laws to cover the scenarios within stepparent and stepchild relationships
that result in actual injury to a party, and to invalidate the categorical
prohibitions of stepparent and stepchild relationships that sweep too
broadly to be considered to fit within this exception in Lawrence.
The second exception to when the Lawrence protection does not
apply is when there is “abuse of an institution the law protects.”82

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
See id. at 259–60.
See id.
See, e.g., State v. Bannister, No. 07CA33, 2008 WL 2954290 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2008).
See id.
See id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
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Sexual relationships between stepparents and stepchildren do not abuse
any institution protected by the law. Again, it is important to note the
Lawrence language indicates that the abuse must be actual abuse, not
just the mere possibility of abuse.83
The Lowe court justifies the statute in question by stating that
stepparent and stepchild sexual relationships are damaging to the
family.84 It is well established that states have an interest in families and
may legally protect them, thus “familial relationships” would most
likely be considered “an institution the law protects.”85 However, it
cannot be said that every time a stepparent and stepchild engage in
sexual activity with each other it is damaging to a family unit. Lowe
implicitly asserted this very point, stating that the government cannot
say it is protecting a family without a finding that there was ever a
family-like relationship including and involving both Lowe and the
stepdaughter.86 Although the Lowe court rejected this argument, saying
that the state may protect any “family” no matter what form, this
generalized protection of anything that might be a family is too broad to
fall under the exception in Lawrence, which calls for actual damage
done to an actual family.87 To fit under the exception, there needs to be
not only a “family” to protect, but also damage that is caused every time
this type of conduct occurs. Given the wide variety and types of people
and families, it cannot be assumed that stepparent and stepchild
relationships will always cause damage to a family.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that every time a stepparent
and stepchild have sexual contact it damages a family unit, the damage
done does not necessarily rise to the level required to cause stepparent
and stepchild relationships to be excluded from the jurisdiction of
Lawrence. “Abuse” is a strong term, indicating that the Lawrence Court
did not intend to call for the prohibition of an activity merely because it
is at odds with a legally protected institution: the activity must be so
crippling to the institution that it can be deemed abusive.88 While
extramarital sexual relationships in general are destructive to a family
unit, the degree of harm caused varies greatly family to family. It
cannot be said that every time a spouse sleeps with another person, even
if that other person is his or her stepchild, there has been an “abuse” of
the familial institution. There is nothing on the record in Lowe that
indicates that any damage to the family unit arose due to the sexual
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id.
Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 264–65 (6th Cir. 2011).
See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264.
Id. at 264–65.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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contact, much less that any damage was so severe as to be deemed
“abusive.” Allowing stepparent and stepchild relationships to fall under
this exception to Lawrence would be too serious of a condemnation for
this category of relationship without any showing of it uniformly
causing any harm, let alone serious harm, to the institution of the family.
To summarize, stepparent and stepchildren relationships fall within
the jurisdiction of Lawrence. The Lawrence case is the leading case on
all “taboo” sexual topics, including stepparent and stepchild
relationships, and is not solely about homosexual sodomy. Stepparent
and stepchild relationships such as the one described in Lowe also do not
fall into the two exceptions to the broad reach of Lawrence because
there is no actual injury to a person or abuse of a legally protected
institution that automatically arises every time a stepparent and stepchild
engage in sexual activity.
B. Sexual Privacy as Fundamental Right
Having determined that stepparent and stepchild sexual relations falls
under the Lawrence line of cases, it now must be determined what
standard of review must be applied to sexual privacy cases. This hinges,
in part, on whether or not Lawrence announced a new fundamental right
to adult consensual sexual privacy.
The arguments for and against reading Lawrence as creating a
fundamental right have been well thought out and developed over the
years, and there is strong support for each side.89 However, given the
lack of clarity of the Court on this matter and the extreme weight and
meaning that fundamental rights carry, it cannot be said that the
Lawrence Court announced a fundamental right to sexual privacy.
The circuits that do not read Lawrence as having created a
fundamental right to sexual privacy, including Lowe, point out that the
Lawrence Court never mentioned that it was creating a fundamental
right.90 This is especially alarming given that Scalia, in his dissent,
specifically asserted that the majority was creating a sexual privacy
right, and yet the majority was still silent on the matter.91 This is a
notable omission on the part of the Court and one that was not likely to
occur if, in fact, the Court was trying to create a fundamental right to
sexual privacy.
Additionally, the Lawrence Court did not follow the usual
89. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d
762 (10th Cir. 2008).
90. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; see, e.g., Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235
(11th Cir. 2004).
91. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Washington v. Glucksburg formula for announcing a fundamental
right.92 The Court failed to describe explicitly even the scope of its
holding, let alone the scope of any fundamental right.93 One purpose of
the Glucksburg formula is to make clear what is or is not part of that
fundamental right.94 Holding that a decision announces a fundamental
right without having clear boundaries for what the right covers is simply
unworkable and would lead to countless courtroom battles. In the
Lawrence opinion there is no clear indication what exactly “sexual
privacy” covers, and this is not explicit enough to satisfy the first prong
of the Glucksburg formula.
The Lawrence Court also failed to fulfill the second prong of the
Glucksburg test: describing how the right fits within the Constitution’s
“implicit [notions] of ordered liberty.”95 The Court did examine the
history of sexual privacy somewhat, but this examination focused
mostly on modern history and homosexual sexual activity.96 The
historical analysis of the issue may have been sufficient to satisfy the
Glucksburg test if the fundamental right being asserted were a right to
engage in homosexual sexual activity, but it was not enough to satisfy a
broader fundamental right to sexual privacy.
Courts holding that the Lawrence decision did announce a
fundamental right to sexual privacy also have a strong argument. First,
those circuits note that the cases that the Lawrence majority relied upon
to overturn Bowers all asserted a protected liberty interest in sexual
matters.97 While this fact is certainly significant, it is not sufficient to
imply that a fundamental right was created because of this reliance.
Furthermore, the cases that the majority relied on all asserted their
respective liberty interests in the traditional manner: they all clearly
explained the right and described how it fits into “concept[s] of ordered
liberty.”98
Secondly, and more persuasively, these circuits argue that because the
majority explicitly adopted Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers, a right
to sexual privacy was asserted.99 In the Bowers dissent, Stevens
described the sexual privacy line of cases as establishing a fundamental
right for adults to engage in private intimate conduct.100 While it cannot
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
(1977).
99.
100.

See id. at 558.
See id. at 558–79.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
Id.; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79.
Id. at 565–66; see, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78; e.g., Cook, 528 F.3d at 53.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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be denied that the general trend has been to grant more liberty interest
rights in the sexual activities realm, this trend alone does not create a
broad fundamental right to sexual privacy. Allowing judicial trends in
and of themselves to create a fundamental right to something could have
disastrous consequences: without well-drawn lines delineating what is
and what is not part of the right, nearly anything can be made into a
“fundamental right.” This line of support is also weakened by the fact
that the Lawrence majority never re-asserted this notion from Stevens in
Bowers in the Lawrence opinion.101 Again, something as important as
creating a fundamental right to an activity or status cannot, and should
not, be announced through implication.
Deliberate steps must be taken to form the lines of any fundamental
right, and the Lawrence Court failed to do so. Lawrence should not be
read as creating a fundamental right to sexual privacy because it never
explicitly showed that it intended to create such a right, and because
protected liberty rights are too important and too influential to allow
them to be simply implied. Thus, there is no fundamental right to sexual
privacy that would include the right to stepparent and stepchild
consensual sexual relationships.
C. Standard of Review
Just because the Lawrence Court did not announce a fundamental
right to sexual activity such as stepparent and stepchild relationships
does not mean such relationships are offered no protection under the
law. What standard of review should be used in subsequent “taboo”
sexual activity cases is another area of debate after the Lawrence
decision.
Some circuits read Lawrence as applying a new constitutional
standard of review, which would fall somewhere between rational basis
They call this standard heightened, or
and strict scrutiny.102
intermediate, review.103 These courts cite to the language used in the
opinion as a source of support for their interpretation of what standard
was applied.104 This language, much like the language used to make the
argument that the court announced a protected liberty interest in sexual
privacy, is strongly supportive of the sexual privacy right at issue and
indicates that the Supreme Court was weighing the right heavily when
making its decision. For example, the Court stated, “It is the promise of
the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79.
E.g., Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008); Cook, 528 F.3d at 53.
E.g., Witt, 527 F.3d at 816; Cook, 528 F.3d at 53.
E.g., Witt, 527 F.3d at 816; Cook, 528 F.3d at 53.
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government may not enter.”105 This language indicates that the Justices
recognize that sexual privacy demands a higher standard of protection
than what rational basis review affords.
Even more persuasively, circuits suggesting that an intermediate
standard of review was used in Lawrence suggest that when the
language of the Court is ambiguous, lower courts should look to what
was actually done in the case to determine how they should proceed.106
In Lawrence, the Court not only invalidated the Texas anti-homosexual
sodomy law, but also overturned the previous Bowers case that held
these types of laws to be valid.107 Although the state advanced the
previously validated theory that promoting morality is a legitimate
governmental interest,108 the Court nonetheless held that the law could
not stand. This outcome indicates that the Court was using some higher
standard, such as intermediate review. Using this test of looking at what
actually happened in the case when there is ambiguity necessarily leads
to what the Court actually meant to indicate with its holding. Looking at
Lawrence and using the “what actually happened” test, it is clear that the
Supreme Court did not apply rational basis review to the sodomy laws.
Thus rational basis does not apply to any sexual privacy right that falls
under the jurisdiction of Lawrence; intermediate review is the correct
standard.109
However, there are still circuits that insist that rational basis review
was used by the Lawrence Court, and their arguments are not without
merit.110 First, these courts point to one passage in the Lawrence
decision that echoes the traditional languages used when applying
rational basis review: “The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and
private life.”111 Although this language undoubtedly seems to indicate
that rational basis review was used, there are multiple passages
throughout the decision that appear to negate this assertion and indicate
that a higher standard was used.112 Instead of pulling out line after line
105. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
106. See Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004).
107. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78.
108. Thus, under this theory, morality would be sufficient under rational basis review to justify a
law that is under a constitutionality attack.
109. It is worth noting that even the Circuits that found that there was a fundamental right to
sexual privacy say that intermediate review, not strict scrutiny, was used by the Court. This is notable
because strict scrutiny is the default standard when a protected liberty interest is in question. E.g., Cook
v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2008).
110. E.g., Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008).
111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 560.
112. For example, the majority asserted, “[L]iberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in
deciding how to conduct their private lives in matter pertaining to sex.” Id. at 572.
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that supports or negates each side, it is easier in cases of such ambiguity
to look past the text of the decision and look into what is being done.
As indicated above, such an inquiry leads to a finding that intermediate
scrutiny was used by the Lawrence Court.
Additionally, these circuits argue that because no fundamental right
was created, the default standard of review is then rational basis.113 The
Lawrence Court, they say, invalidated the sodomy law based on rational
basis review.114 This is a weighty argument because this is traditionally
how the federal courts have operated in determining what standard of
review to apply.115 However, in recent years there has been the slow
emergence of the intermediate review standard and this automatic
assumption of what standard applies is no longer a safe one.116 These
circuits rely on an outdated system for determining the review standard,
leading to illogical conclusions. As mentioned above, courts have
previously held that promoting morality is a legitimate state interest
sufficient to justify any law that is challenged under rational basis
review, but in Lawrence, the Court invalidated the statute despite the
fact that the state is allowed to promote the “morality” behind
prohibiting homosexual activity.117 This means that the Court, without
explicitly saying as much, has now held either that morality is no longer
a sufficient justification under rational basis review, or that a higher
standard of review was used. Justice Scalia asserted that the Court
ended morality legislation and once again the majority was silent on this
observation.118 Because morality legislation has a long history of being
considered a legitimate state interest, ending all morality justification
would be a drastic measure. It is doubtful that the Court would discard
such a long line of case law without expressly saying it was doing so.
Thus, it is more likely that they Court was applying an intermediate
standard of review, rather than asserting that promoting morality is no
longer a legitimate state interest.
D. Application to Lowe
Having determined that the Lawrence holding applies to Lowe and
any other statute prohibiting stepparent and stepchild relationships and
that an intermediate standard of review is the appropriate standard for
sexual privacy cases, the decision in Lowe must be re-considered using
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

E.g. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 771–72.
Id. at 771.
E.g., Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (2007).
See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 453–54 (1985).
E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558–79.
Lawrence, 536 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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this standard of review.
In order for the Ohio statute in question to survive a constitutionality
attack under the intermediate standard of review, it must be found that
the statute furthers an important government interest and that the statute
is substantially related to the stated interest.119 The Lowe court, along
with the state, essentially asserted three reasons for the creation of the
statute: fear of coercion due to the relationship between the stepparent
and the stepchild, a desire to protect the family unit from intra-family
and extra-marital relationships, and the promotion of morality through
prohibiting an incest-like activity.120
Protecting an innocent party from being coerced into sexual activity
that he or she truly does not consent to is undoubtedly an important
governmental interest. The problem with the Ohio statute is that it is not
substantially related to this interest. As mentioned above, any sexual
contact that is initiated due to coercion is not consensual. The state
already has laws that serve the interest of prohibiting coercion into
sexual activity without making the broad assumption that all sexual
conduct between stepparents and stepchildren is coerced.121 With laws
already in place to address this potential problem, there is no need to
have an additional law that prohibits not only this type of coerced
activity, but also all non-coerced, truly consensual sexual activity
between two people just because they have a stepparent and stepchild
relationship.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that having this ban on all
stepparent and stepchildren sexual relationships will prevent this
problem from happening, much less in any “substantial” way. This law
likely is not well-known to people, in part because it deals with incestlike activity rather than incest as it is generally known and defined by
the public.122 While the average person may know that sexual relations
with a close blood relative is prohibited by law, they likely do not know
that the state also considers legal relationships, such as stepparent and
stepchild relationships, incestuous. Thus, the law has no deterrence
effect on any stepparent with ill intentions because he or she lacks actual
knowledge of it and because the law is broader than what the average
person knows to be “incest”; the stepparent will not guess that his or her
actions are prohibited and the undesired activity will not be prevented.

119. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
120. Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 260–64 (6th Cir. 2011).
121. See, e.g., State v. Bannister, No. 07CA33, 2008 WL 2954290 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2008).
122. For example, Dictionary.com defines incest as “(1) sexual intercourse between closely
related persons. (2) the crime of sexual intercourse, cohabitation, or marriage between persons within
the degrees of consanguinity or affinity wherein marriage is legally forbidden.”
Incest,
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/incest (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
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Protecting the family unit is the second interest that the court in Lowe
outlined as being a driving force behind the statute.123 Speaking in the
most generic terms, maintaining functional families is an important
governmental issue. In Lowe, the specific justification for the statute the
court cited is protection from “the destructive influence of intra-family,
extra-marital sexual contact.”124 This narrow justification likely would
be considered an important governmental interest, but the central
assumptions upon which it rests are troublesome for the “substantial
relationship” portion of intermediate review.
First, this justification assumes that the sexual conduct will be
“destructive.” As mentioned above, this is an assumption that should
not automatically be allowed to stand. Families no longer look or
operate like they did in the past. Modern families are prone to have a
wide variety of beliefs and eccentricities. In a family where a stepparent
and an adult stepchild both consent to engage in sexual activity, the
relationship boundaries between the spouses may not be defined in such
a way that extra-marital relations would be destructive. Automatically
assuming that any conduct of this type will be destructive is not
permissible. The court did not cite to any data that shows how families
are or have been affected by sexual activity between stepparents and
stepchildren.125 There is simply no evidence of stepparent and stepchild
relationships being destructive to the family unit in the manner asserted
by the state for their important interest, and, based on the wide variety
and types of familial relationships that exist, this blanket assumption
that this type of relationship will be destructive is not sufficient to
conclude that there is a substantial relationship between the state’s right
to protect the family and the statute in question.
Second, the justification assumes that stepparent and stepchild sexual
relationships will be “intra-family,” implying that there is some type of
family unit in place to begin with. The Lowe court went as far as to say
that the factual circumstances of the case do not matter, such as whether
or Lowe and his stepdaughter were ever actually part of any sort of
family unit together; the state has an interest in protecting all families
“irrespective of the particular family dynamic.”126 By not looking into
the facts to determine if the stepparent and stepchild in question ever
were part of the same family, the court once again failed to acknowledge
all the ways modern people both are and are not in families. Under the
statute, the court will at times do nothing to protect the dynamics of nonlegally recognized families—because of a lack of legal relationship
123.
124.
125.
126.

Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264.
Id.
See id. at 259–65.
Id. at 264–65.
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between the parties—while punishing stepparents and stepchildren who
were never really a part of the same family unit, just because one party
is technically the stepparent.127
A broad assertion of a right to protect all families no matter what type
may be sufficient under rational basis review, but under the stricter
standard of intermediate review it cannot suffice. Holding that such a
generalized interest in families of whatever type—even “families” that
are families only on paper—is an important interest gives the
government too much power to interfere on the privacy rights of
citizens. Only the more narrow interest asserted by the court in Lowe
can be said to be an important interest because it more clearly delineates
what the state is trying to avoid. However, because stepparent and
stepchild status is merely a technical, legal status that does not indicate
to what extent, if any, both parties are members of the same family,
there is no substantial relationship between protecting a family and
prohibiting consenting stepchildren from having sexual relationships
with their stepparents. The assumption that stepparent and stepchild
status automatically makes the pair a family is too much of a leap for the
modern day.
Although the state does have an important interest in protecting a
family from “the destructive influence of intra-family, extra-marital
sexual contact,” the Lowe court bases its conclusion that the statute in
question is substantially related to this interest because it relies on two
faulty assumptions.128 In modern times, it cannot be assumed that
sexual relationships between stepparents and stepchildren will be
destructive or will be damaging to any type of family unit. Thus, this
justification for the statute also fails intermediate review.
Finally, the Court bases its justification on the ability of the states to
promote morality.129 This line of reasoning has critical flaws after
Lawrence. Morality has been held to be a legitimate state interest, but
not an important one, in previous cases.130 There is nothing in case law
that indicates that morality alone can be a great enough justification to

127. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2012). Take, for example, the following
hypothetical situations: In family 1, the mother and her boyfriend have raised her child since the child
was very young. As long as the mother and the boyfriend never get married, the boyfriend and the child
are free to engage in consensual sexual activity when the child reaches the age of majority without fear
of punishment under the statute, despite living as a family unit for years. In family 2, the mother meets
her new husband late in life when her child is already an adult. The child has never lived with the new
husband and perhaps has never even met him before the day they decide to engage in consensual sexual
contact. In this scenario, the husband has committed a sexual assault by sleeping with his stepdaughter,
despite the fact that they have never lived or functioned as a family.
128. Lowe, 663 F.3d at 264–65.
129. Id.
130. E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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satisfy an intermediate standard of review.131 In Lawrence, the majority
appears to apply an intermediate standard when looking at the antihomosexual sodomy law. The only justification for the law was that it
was based on moral condemnation for that particular type of sexual
activity.132 The Court voided the statute, in effect saying that a morality
justification alone is not sufficient.133
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Lawrence majority used
rational basis review to invalidate the statute, morality would not even
be a sufficient justification under the lowest level of review; it would not
even be a legitimate state interest. Morality alone cannot itself be an
interest important enough to justify the statute in question in Lowe.
Thus, none of the three interests asserted by the Lowe court are
sufficient under the intermediate standard of review to support the
continued viability of the Ohio statute that prohibits stepparent and
stepchild sexual relationships. There is no substantial relationship
between the statute and a prevention of coerced sexual contact or a
prevention of destructive influences on the family. Additionally,
morality alone is not enough to be an important interest to justify the
statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The muddled language of the Lawrence Court’s decision has created
a wide rift between the circuits when it comes to upholding the right to
adult sexual privacy. Even so, a careful analysis reveals that the Court
intended to afford more protection to adult sexual privacy. The actions
of the Court, coupled with some strong language used by the majority,
demonstrate that an intermediate standard of review was used in
Lawrence and is appropriate for other “taboo” sexual topics.
One such “taboo” topic is stepparent and stepchild adult consensual
sexual relationships. The Ohio statute that categorically prohibits all
stepparent and stepchild relations sweeps too broadly to satisfy the
intermediate review required under Lawrence, and is thus
unconstitutional. As Lowe itself demonstrates, there is not a sufficient
enough relationship between the state’s asserted interests, prevention of
coercion and protection of the family, to allow a broad prohibition on
this category of adult relationships. By criminalizing Lowe for
engaging in sexual contact with his consenting, adult stepdaughter, the
state infringes on their constitutional right to privacy. It is time for the

131. See, e.g., id.
132. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
133. Id. at 559–60.
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state to heed the words of Lawrence and get out of the bedrooms of its
citizens.
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